I think, therefore, exist
(Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637)
The desire to understand the human mind is one of the oldest activities known to man, and many of them have described this desire as the essence of what makes us human. Although this area was originally the playing field of philosophers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, and Kant, and these are just a few of them — their insight laid the foundation for the transition of the field to more scientific efforts in cognitive psychology. Traditional theories may have focused on more normative aspects of directional thinking, designed to define practical strategies through logic and systematic argument, although modern cognitive theories try to understand the underlying psychological processes of thinking and its dynamic effects on our judgment and behavior (Sternberg, 2005 )). ).
When you face judgment in a problem-solving situation, the relationship of the human brain with a variety of complex strategies. The most influential work in solving problems was associated with Gestalt psychologists at the beginning of the twentieth century (King and others. 1994). Researchers such as Wertheimer, Danker and Lucins have published compelling studies of the structure and dynamics of problem-solving strategies, forming the basis for the latest theories, such as Piaget’s cognitive development and the social cognitive Pandora theory (King and others. 1994). Modern pioneers are calling for a multifaceted approach to understanding knowledge, seeking to combine known cognitive processes (for example, deductive / inductive inference, symbolic and analogical representation, abstract thinking, algorithmic logic and pattern detection) into a single theory (for example, Newell, 1990),
Although it may be easier to make the right judgments if they are associated with all the relevant information or if hours are set for directional research, many of the decisions that we make in everyday life are deprived of such advantages. When you encounter knowledge of the poor situations or in conditions of limited time or uncertainty, we rather rely on “rules of thumb”; or informative heuristic (Gleitman and others. , 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). In the 1970s series, Amos of Tver and Daniel Kahneman changed the psychology of human judgment. assuming that instead of depending on complex systems, we actually use a limited number of simple cognitive heuristics when they are presented with limited information (Hollyoak & Morrison, 2005). For example, they suggested that people judge the likelihood of events based on how they are presented. a large group or other similar examples are a phenomenon that they submitted by representative heuristics (Tversky & Kannmeman, 1972). This idea fits well with accepted models of learning theory, which we tend to classify and store things by combining (Sternberg, 2006). ) and are subject to effects such as stereotyping (Gleitman and others. , 2004)
Another heuristic demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman is heuristic access (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This heuristic is based on the idea that when asked to estimate the frequency or probability of an event, we base our opinion on how easy it is to think about relevant examples. In the experiment on testing this heuristic, they presented four lists of names to participants: two lists in which there were 19 famous women and 20 less known men, and two lists in which there were 19 known men and 20 less known women (study 8, 1973). Using the design between groups, the first group was asked to recall as many names as possible, and the second group was asked to evaluate which class was more frequent, known or less known. The results give two ideas. First, famous names were most easily recalled compared to less well-known names. Moreover, although less well-known names were more frequent, most participants mistakenly estimated that famous names appear more often. Therefore, the key factor that emerged from this study (and others) is that, although accessibility heuristics are an effective strategy in many situations, that is, they lead to accurate judgments - they can also lead to systematic errors and, especially at the referee frequency (Tversky & Kahneman 1973,1974).
The idea that this simple heuristic is the basis of frequency judgments and leads to bias is important in jurisprudence studies. According to the citation index of social sciences (Institute of Scientific Information, 1970-1982), the Tverskoy and Kahneman article in 1973 on accessibility heuristics is cited 24 times a year compared with an average value of 1.4 times a year (Armstrong, 1984) ). However, despite these impressive figures, their original research received some criticism (Schwarz et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1982; Gigerenzer and others. , 1991). Some researchers expressed concern about the combined variables, suggesting that the design of their earlier experiments was ambiguous in determining as accessibility heuristics really works. For example, consider the experiment described above again. Do subjects evaluate their frequency scores with the subjective ease of recalling famous names or do they base their estimates on the actual number of content reviews?
In 1991, Schwartz and others. al conducted experiments designed to solve this problem. They set reminder tasks to report either 6 or 12 aggressive behaviors to which participants had previously participated; It is assumed that 6 copies (based on preliminary testing) as “simple” recall and 12 copies as difficult. Then they asked participants to judge their own confidence. The results showed that, despite the fact that they were able to recall the 12 aggressive actions that they personally engaged, this higher amount of feedback did not affect their perception of their own confidence. In fact, because the task of trying to remember 12 behaviors was subjectively perceived as more complex, they judged that their own confidence was less than average. This data seems to address this confusion about the detonation process and supports the original assertion of Tversky and Kanemansa (1973) that frequency judgments are based on the subjective ease of recall.
Other researchers questioned other factors related to the validity of their experimental design. First, the repetition of the original studies was not achieved until 1998 (except for one article in 1991 by White), and, moreover, their bias results in the frequency judgment seem to contradict current studies that indicate then, people can draw answers that reflect the actual relative frequency of events with great precision[Watkins&LeCompte1991;Jonide&Jones1992;Sedlmeieretal1998)[Watkins&LeCompte1991;Jonide&Jones1992;Sedlmeieretal1998)
This is a matter of concern for researchers such as Gerd Gigerentser (1991, 1996), who participated in purely discussions on this topic and other critical comments, such as the proposed subtleties of the difference between probability and frequency. Future research should focus on this practice in an attempt to eliminate any difficulties. Some recent studies by Brown et al. (1995) on sample paragraphs have provided some evidence that accessibility heuristics are just one of many strategies related to frequency estimation. Indeed, recent work on the theory of support for Tversky and Rottenshreich (Tversky and Rottenstreich, 1997) suggests that significance and explication of a description of events can have a significant impact on how to judge their frequency or probability, and this idea is supported by several more recent studies (Sternberg , 2006). Therefore, a more integrated approach to future research is sometimes required, working on something like a unified theory similar to that proposed by Newel - certainly, the complexity of the human mind indicates that we are only scratching the surface.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Armstrong, J. (1984) A Review of Daniel Kaneman, Paul Slovik and Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment on Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias, The science , 185 (4157).
Eysenck, MW & Keane, MT (2000) Cognitive psychology: a textbook for students, Taylor and Francis, London.
Gigerenzer, G., (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: the answer to Kahneman and Tversky (1996). Psychological review 103, 592-596.
Gigerenzer, G., (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: beyond heuristics and biases European review of social psychology , 2 83-115.
Gleitman, H., Fridlund, AJ, & Reisberg, D. (2004) Psychology (6th edition), New York / London,
Holyoak, KJ & Morrison, RG (2005) Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, UK.
Jonides, J., & Jones, CM (1992). Direct coding frequency of occurrence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and knowledge, 18, 368-378.
King, DB, Wertheimer, M., Keller, H & Crichetiere, K. (1994). The legacy of Max Wertheimer and Gestalt psychology - the sixtieth anniversary, 1934-1994: "The heritage of our past." Social studies, 61 (4), 907
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of knowledge. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F. & Klumpp, G. (1991) Ease of searching as information: a different look at accessibility heuristics , Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 61 (2), 195-202.
Sedlmeier, P., Hertwig, R. & Gigerenzer, G. (1995) Are judgments about the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to accessibility? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition , 24 (3), 754-770
Sherman, SJ and Corty, E. (1984). Cognitive heuristics. In RS Wyer & TK Sruli (Ed.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 189-286). Hillsdale, NJ: Eribaum.
